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Disclosure to an Audience with Limited Attention
In our model, informed players decide whether or not to disclose, and observers allo-
cate attention among disclosed signals, and toward reasoning through the implications
of a failure to disclose. In equilibrium disclosure is incomplete, and observers are un-
realistically optimistic. Nevertheless, regulation requiring greater disclosure can reduce
observers’ belief accuracies and welfare. A stronger tendency to neglect disclosed signals
increases disclosure, whereas a stronger tendency to neglect failures to disclose reduces
disclosure. Observer beliefs are influenced by the salience of disclosed signals, and dis-
closure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in other fundamentally unrelated arenas.
So now we turn to the task of determining how to get more transparency – true
transparency and not just more data with the unintended consequence of investor
overload and the unnecessary reporting burden on companies.
—SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman, quoted by Paredes (2004), pp. 25-26.
1 Introduction
In the classic models of voluntary disclosure of verifiable information, observers exhibit
extreme skepticism about those who do not reveal what they know (see Grossman (1981)
and Milgrom (1981)). This skepticism is the rational response of observers to the incen-
tive of a party with adverse information to withhold it. In practice, observers do tend
to be skeptical of those who fail to disclose. However, the further implication of these
models that there will be full disclosure is in practice often violated. Advertisers, con
artists, firms, and politicians often do not disclose information adverse to their product
or case.
Several extensions to the basic theory allow for the withholding of information.1
Disclosure costs provide an innocent reason for non-disclosure, i.e., a reason other than
the possession of an adverse signal. So disclosure costs make observers somewhat less
skeptical of non-disclosure.2 Thus, an informed player with a sufficiently favorable signal
discloses, whereas if his signal is below some cutoff he withholds it. However, in these
models full disclosure is still approached as disclosure costs become small.3
Interesting evidence about the degree of observer skepticism is provided by the mar-
ket for salad dressing. Prior to the The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1994,
there was some voluntary provision of label information about fat content, mostly of
low-fat brands. This legislation mandated quantitative disclosure of fat content. Sub-
sequently, fattier dressings lost market share (Mathios (2000)). If consumers had been
1These include the models of Jovanovic (1982), Verrecchia (1983), Fishman and Hagerty (1989),
Darrough and Stoughton (1990), and Teoh (1997).
2The rational skepticism of observers can even, in more complex signalling settings, pressure informed
parties to reveal adverse information signals and withhold favorable ones (Teoh and Hwang (1991),
Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To (2002)).
3Alternatively, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) examine a setting in which informed firms set prices and
decide whether or not to disclose a signal about the quality of its product, and a subset of customers
possess information complementary to the disclosed signal. This leads to differential updating by
customers based upon the disclosed signal, and the possibility that in equilibrium firms do not disclose.
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highly attentive and appropriately skeptical, without regulation they would have already
inferred a high fat content among non-disclosing products.
There are several other strands of evidence that more directly cast doubt on the
assumption underlying most existing models of disclosure that observers are fully at-
tentive to publicly available information. For example, securities prices sometimes react
strongly to irrelevant information (such as news about an unrelated firm whose abbre-
viation can be confused with the company’s ticker symbol; see Rashes (2001)), and to
the salient republication of information that is already publicly available (see Ho and
Michaely (1988) and Huberman and Regev (2001)).
In this paper, observers are insufficiently skeptical because of limited attention and
cognitive processing power. Limited attention sometimes causes observers to fail to
take into account the implications of an absence of a signal— that an informed player
has deliberately withheld relevant information. This credulity weakens the pressure
on informed players to disclose. As a result, even when there are no exogenous costs
of disclosure and the disclosing player surely is informed, in equilibrium disclosure is
incomplete. On the other hand, limited attention in our model also sometimes causes
a failure to process disclosed signals. This induces greater disclosure, by reducing the
reputational penalty to a low type player of disclosing.
Our assumption of limited attention is intended to capture two stylized facts. First is
the obvious fact that human information processing power is limited, which follows from
the physical and design constraints of the human brain. A large literature in psychology
studies limited attention, as discussed in Subsection 2.1.
The second is that people in certain contexts seem to be less skeptical about the
incentives for strategic behavior of interested parties than rationality would seem to re-
quire. A body of evidence discussed in Subsection 2.2 suggests that the limited attention
and credulity of investors about the motives of firms, analysts, and brokers potentially
explains several general patterns in investor trading and capital market prices (these
issues are also discussed in the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002)). In our
model such credulity is a natural consequence of limited attention. More broadly, we
argue that limited attention has important effects on exchange between informed and
uninformed parties in a range of settings, such as securities markets, consumer product
markets, and non-market social interactions.
In our model, limited attention takes a simple form. Owing to cognitive resources,
an individual sometimes fails to update based upon observable events, and especially
based upon non-events such as the failure of an informed party to disclose some relevant
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information he possesses. Drawing a correct inference from non-disclosure requires both
focusing attention on this non-event, and paying enough attention to the disclosure game
to reason out its strategic implications. In our approach, an individual sometimes does
not take these steps, and therefore fails to update his prior belief at all.
The focus of our analysis is on the equilibrium behavior of an informed player or
players when the audience they face is subject to limited attention. We begin with a
basic model with a single arena of possible disclosure. The informed player understands
that exogenous fraction of his audience ignore disclosed signals—cue neglect; and ignore
the implications of non-disclosure—analytic failure. As a result of analytic failure, in
equilibrium there is a pool of non-disclosing types even though the cost of disclosure
is zero. In contrast, cue neglect encourages disclosure, because the reputational blow
received by the marginal type from disclosing is reduced.
The overall outcome is intuitive: owing to limited attention, in equilibrium there is
only partial disclosure, and on average there is also excessive optimism about the quality
of the informed player. However, this finding does not derive from the raw fact of limited
attention, but from a tendency for observers to attend more fully to disclosed signals
than to a failure to disclose. We further explore the effects of government imposed
disclosure regulation, and of variation in observer attention, on equilibrium levels of
disclosure, and on the precision and bias of average observer perceptions.
We extend the basic model to a setting in which individuals can choose in advance
how carefully to attend to disclosed signals versus attending to a failure to disclose in
an arena. The main insights of the basic setting extend to a setting with endogenous
allocation of attention. In addition, the endogenous attention model allows us to examine
how the degree of substitutability of attentional resources between attention to disclosed
signals versus attention directed toward non-disclosure affects disclosure decisions.
Some key features of research in the psychology of attention are that individuals
attend to only a limited set of cues, that there is competition between different environ-
mental cues for attention, and that more salient or vivid cues (as defined by certain cue
characteristics) capture greater attention (see subsection 2.1). We therefore examine a
setting with two arenas of disclosure in which different informed players can compete
for, or try to hide from, the attention of observers. Competing arenas of attention lead
to effects which we call cue competition and analytic interference. Cue competition is
the tendency for observation of a disclosure in one arena to distract observers’ attention
from disclosure in the other arena. For example, the announcement of an acquisition
may distract investors from the fact that a firm has just missed an earnings forecast; for
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anecdotal evidence, see Wall Street Journal, “Heard on the Street,” 12/18/98, p. C1).
Analytic interference is the tendency for disclosure in one arena to distract ob-
servers from taking into account appropriately the information implicit in the fact of
non-disclosure in the other arena. For example, the announcement of large earnings
surprises by firms in one industry may distract investor attention from a delay in the
issuance of an earnings forecast by a firm in another industry.
We examine the implications of these effects for several issues: (1) Does regulation
requiring disclosure in one arena cause the informed player in the other arena to disclose
less often (‘crowding out’)? (2) Does requiring full disclosure in both arenas increases
the accuracy of perceptions, and social welfare? (3) Is there cross-arena contagion of
news announcements on observer perceptions (or market prices) in other fundamentally
unrelated arenas? Finally, (4) What is the effect of disclosure regulation on observer
welfare in different arenas?
Although our application of limited attention in this paper is to the theory of optimal
disclosure, the simple modelling approach we provide is readily applicable to other prob-
lems in information economics. We suggest some further directions where the approach
can be taken in the conclusion.
Previous work on limited attention and economic decisions has focused mainly on
the imperfect rationality of managers or other organizational decisionmakers (see, e.g.,
the early discussion of March and Simon (1958)). As Simon (1976) remarks, “...the
scarce resource is not information; it is processing capacity to attend to information.”
Several papers have analyzed the allocation of managerial attention across activities.4
Our approach differs in focusing on a general audience of observers. In addition, we
describe how to interpret our model assumptions in the context of a security market
setting. Thus, our approach lends itself to the study of how limited attention affects the
pricing of assets.
There are now a few studies which examine limited attention on the part of a general
audience of observers. Gabaix and Laibson (2002) examine the implications of delayed
information processing for the equity premium puzzle. Peng and Xiong (2002) and Peng
(2004) examine the asset pricing implications of investors’ need to allocate attention
across different securities. Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg (2003) and Gabaix
and Laibson (2004) model the allocation of scarce information processing resources and
verify the effects of attentional constraints experimentally. Our analysis differs from
4See Radner (1975), Radner and Rothschild (1975), Gifford (1992a, 1992b), and Gifford and Wilson
(1995).
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these studies in examining the two-sided problem of attention allocation by observers
and manipulation of inattention by an informed party.
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) examine the consequences of limited investor attention for
financial reporting. Their analysis takes as given that all relevant information is publicly
available (either through disclosure or through spontaneous revelation). They focus on
the effects of additionally reporting information as part of earnings in a firm’s financial
statements. In contrast, our analysis focuses on the decision to disclose information
which otherwise will not be publicly available.
Perhaps the most closely related paper to this one is that of Milgrom and Roberts
(1986). They show that the extreme skepticism results of past literature extend to a
setting in which the informed player can disclose a set to which his signal belongs (rather
than the precise value of the signal)—if observers are rational, there is full disclosure.
However, if there are unsophisticated observers who are insufficiently skeptical, disclosure
can be incomplete.
A key difference in our approach from that of Milgrom and Roberts is that we ana-
lyze a specific source of unsophisticated behavior, limited attention. Thus, we model not
just incomplete skepticism about nondisclosure, but also failure to incorporate disclosed
signals.5 Furthermore, limited attention leads to analysis of how disclosure carries over
between different informational arenas (as with the ‘crowding out’ effect), and how regu-
lation in one arena affects disclosure, beliefs, and welfare in another. Thus, a distinctive
aspect of our approach is our analysis of competitive effects wherein a salient disclosure
attracts attention away from another disclosure; and of interference between attention to
a disclosed signal in one arena and to the implications of a failure to disclose in another.
Some readers may question whether limited attention affects market prices. What is
hard to contest is that both the public comments of policymakers and actual regulations
reflect concerns about protecting investors with limited attention and processing power,
as reflected in the head quote of this article.6 For example, there are rules specifying not
5The latter effect influences the nature of the results. For example, where in Milgrom and Roberts
full disclosure in their basic model requires that the observer be smart enough to draw extreme skeptical
inferences, in our setting there is full disclosure even when some observers are credulous, if inattention
to disclosed signals is sufficiently strong.
6Similarly, during her tenure as acting chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Laura
Unger commented upon Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure): “As a Commissioner of a disclosure-based
agency, I believe that more information is generally better. But is that always the case? ... [W]hat if
the proposals are adopted and result in significantly greater amounts of information coming out in the
form of press release? Do we need to be concerned about potential ’information overload’? ... [W]e
have to remember that information can only empower investors if they understand it and can effectively
apply it.” (As quoted by Paredes (2004), p. 26.)
5
just that certain information items be revealed in a firm’s financial statement, but where
on the financial statement these items must be placed (as with rules on the reporting
of comprehensive income; see Hirst and Hopkins (1998)). Furthermore, a bitter con-
tinuing fight among regulators (the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial
Accounting Statements Board), legislators, and firms concerns whether employee stock
option compensation should be disclosed in a footnote, or should be integrated as part
of reporting earnings (see, e.g., Mayer (2002) and Hof (2004)). Thus, at a minimum it
seems useful to assess rigorously the implications of a view that forms part of the basis
for existing policy.
2 Motivating Evidence
2.1 Psychological Findings about Limited Attention
Limited attention is a necessary consequence of the vast amount of information avail-
able in the environment, and of limits to information processing power. In the face
of cognitive constraints, attention must be selective and requires effort (willful sub-
stitution of cognitive resources from other tasks); see, e.g., Kahneman (1973). Several
well-known decision biases are probably closely related to limits to attention, such as the
phenomenon of narrow framing (as reviewed in Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999)),
which involves analyzing problems in too isolated a fashion.
Attention is required both for the encoding of environmental stimuli (such as a cor-
porate information disclosure), and the processing of ideas in conscious thought (as in
the analysis of a corporate disclosure or of a failure of a company to disclose). As dis-
cussed in Fiske (1995), the encoding process involves taking external information and
representing it internally in a way that enables its use. Conscious thought involves a
focus on particular ideas or memories to the exclusion of others. For example, a sharp
focus on understanding the implications for a firm of a disclosure by that firm may limit
an individual’s ability to study another firm at that time.
Some stimuli tend to be perceived and encoded more easily or retrievably than others.
The salience of a stimulus is its ‘prominence,’ tendency to ‘stand out’, or its degree of
contrast with other stimuli in the environment. For example, an unusually large earnings
surprise is highly salient for investors. The effects of salience are “robust and wide-
ranging” (Fiske and Taylor (1991), ch.7), with influence on judgments about causality,
importance of the stimulus, and how extreme it is. We reflect salience in our model as
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influencing the probability that a signal will be attended to, and the probability that an
individual will analyze correctly the implications of a failure to disclose.
Reasonably enough, a stimulus is also more salient if it is goal-related; e.g., an
individual in a group becomes more salient if you learn that she is to be your new
boss. However, attention to stimuli can be misdirected in many ways, and this affects
judgments. Seemingly trivial manipulations of the salience of stimuli affect judgments
substantially (see, e.g., Taylor and Fiske (1978) Sect. IV). Attention is also drawn
to vivid stimuli.7 In contrast, people tend to underweight abstract, statistical, and
base-rate information (see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Nisbett and Ross
(1980)). In view of these findings, in our model we do not assume that the amount of
attention that observers direct toward a signal corresponds perfectly with its economic
importance. The occurrence of an event is more salient than non-occurrence—the ‘dog
that didn’t bark.’ There is indeed evidence that individuals tend to be more influenced
by the information reflected in the occurrence of an event than the non-occurrence (see,
e.g., Newman, Wolff, and Hearst (1980), and Nisbett and Ross (1980)).
These considerations suggest that in a business setting, disclosures by firms that
are in the news a lot (larger firms or firms in ‘fashionable’ sectors), or are ‘proximate’
and affect-linked for observers who consume the firms’ products (such as entertainment,
sports, or automobile firms) may be particularly salient. Based on vividness, we would
also expect more attention to simple disclosures than to those that are hard to process.
We also expect disclosed information to be processed more readily than the information
implicit in the fact of non-disclosure.
Paying attention to one thing leaves less attention available for other things. Owing
to information overload, attention must be allocated selectively (Pashler (1998)), Ri-
ley and Roitblat (1978)). A literature in psychology has examined how subjects learn
by observation over time to predict a variable that is stochastically related to multiple
cues (see, e.g., Baker, Mercier, Valleettourangeau, Frank, and Pan (1993), Busemeyer,
Myung, and McDaniel (1993) and Kruschke and Johansen (1999)). A consistent find-
ing is that animals and people do not achieve correct understanding of the correlation
structure. Instead, cue competition occurs: salient cues weaken the effects of less salient
ones, and the presence of irrelevant cues causes subjects to use relevant cues and base
rates (unconditional frequencies) less. The presence of multiple cues also causes people
7Vividness is greatest for concrete descriptions and scenarios, personal stories about individual ex-
periences, information that falls into an easily summarized pattern, stimuli that trigger emotional re-
sponses, or which are more ‘proximate in a sensory, temporal or spatial way’ (Nisbett and Ross (1980),
p. 45).
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to make analytical errors, such as ‘learning’ over time to use irrelevant cues.
2.2 Evidence of Limited Attention and Credulity in Markets
Casual observation suggests that observers have limited attention, and are often too
credulous about the strategic incentives of their information sources. Rather than fo-
cusing on detailed, careful analysis of issues, politicians and political pressure groups
invest heavily in ‘sound bites’ or ‘photo ops’ designed to underscore a simple, vivid
message. Relatedly, the notion of ‘rational ignorance’ of voters is consistent with limits
to attention and processing power. Many product advertisements are designed to en-
gage viewers’ attention and emotions in support of a salient catchphrase, rather than
to present a logical or evidentiary case in support of claims about quality and price.8
Despite the evident possibility of interested motives, con artists recurrently seduce the
foolish with get-rich-quick and other scams. So at a minimum there is an extreme tail
of credulous individuals.
A strong indication of limited investor attention is provided by the evidence discussed
in the introduction of stock price reactions to the republication of public information.
There is other evidence that capital markets have a delayed response to public infor-
mation arrival.9 Furthermore, there is also evidence that market prices do not discount
adequately for incentives of firms to act strategically to take advantage of investors. For
example, there is evidence that the market fails to discount sufficiently for the incentive
of firms to manage earnings (see, e.g., Sloan (1996), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998)),
and for the incentive of firms with private information to sell shares when these shares
are overvalued by the market (see Loughran and Ritter (1995)) and to buy shares when
shares are undervalued (see Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)).
With regard to disclosure decisions, an interesting example is provided by pharma-
ceutical companies, which publicize hot blockbuster drug candidates but often remain
silent for long periods about those that do not pan out.10 More generally, firms do on
8Hanson and Kysar (1999) review evidence from the consumer marketing and consumer psychology
literatures, which, they maintain, indicates that sellers successfully manipulate consumer perceptions
of their products.
9There is a delayed market response to earnings surprises (Bernard and Thomas (1990)). There is
evidence that market prices do not immediately reflect long-term information implicit in demographic
data for future industry product demand (DellaVigna and Pollet (2003)), and that closed-end country
fund prices react more strongly to changes in the values of their holdings when news about the country
appears on the front page of The New York Times (Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998)).
10In its 2001 Annual Report, Pfizer Inc. stated that a new anti-depressant, CP-122,721 “offers strong
efficacy with fewer side effects.” Over time analysts inferred that the drug may have been cancelled, but
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occasion collapse when concealed adverse information comes to light.
3 The Economic Setting of the Basic Model
The Informed Player
The informed player observes a signal θ on the interval [θ, θ]. He decides either
to disclose or withhold his signal; if he discloses he must be truthful. We follow the
convention that a player who is indifferent always discloses.
Uninformed Observers
There is a continuum of uninformed observers. Limited attention has two effects.
First, fraction αW of the observers are rationally skeptical about the motives of a non-
disclosing (‘W’ for Withholding) informed player, while the remaining fraction 1 − αW
are inattentive, a phenenomon we call analytic failure. An individual who is inattentive
in this fashion does not update his beliefs from his prior about the informed party’s
signal. This failure to update may occur because he simply does no cognitive processing.
Alternatively, he may note the fact that information was withheld, but fail to take the
further cognitive step of attributing this withholding to the strategic incentives of the
informed party.
For most people, it is no great conceptual leap to recognize the possibility of strate-
gic behavior by an informed party. When paying attention, people are often quick to
recognize such possibilities. However, owing to limited attention, even intelligent people
often neglect fairly obvious points. Time and cognitive resources are limited, there are
many arenas requiring attention, and the universe of possible signals and considerations
to attend to is large.11
The second effect of limited attention in the model is that a fraction αD attend to
information that is disclosed; the remaining fraction 1−αD of observers fail to attend to
the disclosure, a phenomenon we call cue neglect. We assume that αD ≥ αW , based on
the notion that disclosure is salient, and therefore calls attention to itself more strongly
than a failure to disclose. This is consistent with psychological evidence discussed in
this was not confirmed until 2004 upon queries from the news media. As Hensley and Landers (2004)
put it, “The case is hardly exceptional. It is common practice among large pharmaceutical companies
to keep silent when hot prospects in midstage testing stumble– a frequent occurrence.”
11Broadly supportive of this argument (though not specifically a test of it) is evidence that people tend
to underweight the probabilities of event contingencies that are not explicitly available for consideration.
For example, people tend to understimate the probability of ‘other causes’ in a list of possible causes
of an event (Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978)).
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Section 2.1.
The shared prior belief of observers about the informed player’s type has density f(θ)
and distribution function F (θ). The public information set φ is equal either to (D, θ)
(knowledge that information was disclosed, and that the revealed value was θ) or else to
W (knowledge that information was not disclosed).
The average population belief about the type of the informed player is the average
of the credulous/inattentive and the rational beliefs,
θˆD ≡ (1− αD)E[θ] + αDθ
θˆW ≡ (1− αW )E[θ] + αW θˆρ(W ), (1)
where a hat denotes an average observer perception, and a ρ superscript indicates an
attentive belief.12
The informed player’s objective in deciding whether or not to disclose is to achieve
the highest possible average perception among observers, the maximum of θˆD and θˆW
above. For example, in a corporate disclosure context, this would amount to maximizing
the current stock price. As has been found in several models of market equilibrium
when some investors have imperfectly rational beliefs and others have rational beliefs,
equilibrium stock prices reflect a weighted average of the beliefs of both groups of traders
(see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001)), where the weights reflect the
relative numbers, risk tolerances, and perceived risks of individuals with different beliefs.
4 Equilibrium in the Basic Model
4.1 Characterizing the Equilibrium
As is standard in several disclosure models, the behavior of the information recipients
can be viewed in a very simple way. We assign the informed player the objective of
inducing favorable average beliefs on the part of observers.13 We propose a threshold
12Equation (1) has two possible interpretations. One is that observers are ex ante identical, but
each has a probability of being attentive towards different information signals available in the environ-
ment and to the opportunities of the informed player to engage in strategic disclosure behavior. The
other is that some non-stochastic fractions of individuals are by nature attentive or inattentive toward
environmental information and toward the strategic incentives of others.
13This can be viewed as a reduced form of a setting in which observers take actions based upon their
beliefs that affect the informed player. For example, in a corporate disclosure setting, investors would
use incorrect beliefs in their security trading decisions. The resulting stock price would be of concern
to the informed player (a corporate manager).
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equilibrium in which an informed player discloses if and only if his type θ ≥ θ∗, where
θ∗ is a critical signal value.
If the firm does not disclose, then the average expectation among the audience is
a weighted average of the inattentive expectation E[θ], and the rational expectation
θˆρ(W ) = E[θ|θ < θ∗]. So the average perceptions given that the informed player with-
holds, or that he discloses his type θ, are
θˆD = (1− αD)E[θ] + αDθ (2)
θˆW = (1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗]. (3)
When an above-average type discloses, limited attention detracts from his reputation
by (2), whereas limited attention enhances the reputation of a disclosing below-average
type.
The equilibrium threshold value θ∗ makes the informed player just willing to disclose,
(1− αD)E[θ] + αDθ∗ = (1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗], or (4)






The parameter γ measures the excess attention paid to an arena when a signal is disclosed
rather than withheld. The possible equilibria are as follows.
Proposition 1 For all parameter values, an equilibrium exists. If:
1. αW ≥ αD > 0, then the unique equilibrium entails full disclosure;
2. 0 < αW < αD, then in equilibrium there exists a threshold value θ∗, θ < θ∗ < E[θ],
such that the informed player discloses if his signal θ ≥ θ∗, and withholds if θ < θ∗.
To prove this, we will establish that the gain to an informed player of disclosing is a
monotonic increasing function of θ for any given inference by attentive observers about
the implications of non-disclosure. By (3) and (2), the difference
θˆD − θˆW = αDθ + (αW − αD)E[θ]− αWEρ[θ|W ] (7)
is indeed monotonic in θ. Thus, there are up to three possible types of equilibrium: (i)
All types disclose; (ii) No types disclose; and (iii) A player discloses if and only if his
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type equals or exceeds a critical value θ∗, θ < θ∗ ≤ θ. In a proposed equilibrium with
no disclosure (ii), the perception of a type that withheld would be E[θ], so any type
θ > E[θ] would prefer to disclose. This breaks the proposed equilibrium, so only (i) and
(iii) are viable equilibrium candidates.
If αW = αD, then γ = 0, and there is full disclosure (i), because equation (5) can
only be satisfied by θ∗ = θ. If αW > αD, then γ < 0, and there is no θ∗ satisfying (5);
the informed player always prefers to disclose. It remains to be shown that if αW < αD,
full disclosure (i) is not an equilibrium, so that only possibility (iii) remains, and that
equilibrium exists. The proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, when αW < αD, the
expected reputational penalty on a low type for failing to disclose is so small that such a
type strictly prefers to withhold its signal. Finally, the critical value θ∗ < E[θ], because
an above-average type would always prefer to disclose in the hope of being attended to,
rather than being viewed as being below the threshold (and therefore, on average below
E[θ]).
This threshold equilibrium is analogous to those described in the models of Jovanovic
(1982) and Verrecchia (1983). In their models, threshold behavior derives from a trans-
action cost of disclosure. Here, possible non-disclosure by low types results not from a
disclosure cost, but from limited attention by observers to non-disclosure.
As discussed by DellaVigna and Pollet (2004), the cost of attending to a firm’s
earnings disclosure is likely to increase at the onset of weekends. Consistent with reduced
attention to Friday disclosures, they find that the stock price sensitivity to earnings news
is weaker to Friday disclosures than to Monday through Thursday disclosures, and that
there is a catchup reaction to Friday earnings announcements which occurs over a period
of weeks. They further find that firms are much more likely to disclose bad news on
Fridays than on Mondays through Thursdays.
This evidence suggests that on non-Fridays firms disclose good news signals and
withhold bad news for disclosure on Friday. Since earnings must be disclosed sometime,
part of the attention toward the withholding of a signal on a given day is the attention
paid to it when it is disclosed on a later day. If we interpret the lower attention paid
to a non-Friday signal that is withheld until Friday as a lower αW on the non-Friday,
then for non-Fridays the premise of threshold equilibrium Part 2 of Proposition 1 that
αW < αD obtains, so that bad news is withheld. On Friday, in contrast, a signal that
is withheld to be disclosed another day of the week will receive more attention when
it is eventually revealed. If we interpret this greater attention to a signal withheld on
Friday as a higher αW , then on Friday αW can exceed αD, which encourages immediate
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disclosure of bad news on Friday. Thus, the evidence is consistent with Proposition 1.
Similarly, there is evidence that good news is disclosed early in the trading day,
and bad news is deferred to later in the trading day (Patell and Wolfson (1982)). If
information processing takes time, and if there is less attention after trading hours than
during trading hours, then news disclosed late in the day receives less attention than
news received early in the day. Consistent with the premise that there is less attention to
news arriving after trading hours, Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992) document that
after-hours earnings announcements are gradually impounded into price in the days
after the disclosure. Thus, the non-disclosure of adverse earnings news early in the day
is consistent with the threshold equilibrium of Proposition 1.
4.2 Comparative Statics on the Amount of Disclosure
Attention by observers to the withholding of information, αW , and attention to dis-
closure, αD, have opposing effects on the incentive of the informed player to disclose.
Attention to a failure to disclose increases skepticism toward the informed player who
withholds, encouraging disclosure. In contrast, attention to disclosure discourages dis-
closure by the marginal type. Since θ∗ < E[θ] (Proposition 1 Part 2), the marginal type
is reevaluated adversely when observers attend to his disclosure.
Intuitively, the threshold value θ∗ should decrease with αW and increase with γ;
less attention to withholding should accommodate more non-disclosure. Introducing
some inattentiveness toward withholding creates a pool of non-disclosing types, and as
αW → 0, the pool of non-disclosing types eventually includes all below-average types (so
θ∗ = E[θ]).
To understand the effect of varying αD, consider the critical type θ∗. Higher αD
increases the fraction of observers who, when the informed player discloses, perceive his
type as θ∗ < E[θ] instead of the prior E[θ]. This discourages disclosure, implying higher
θ∗. This reasoning is consistent with (8).







Applying (3) and (2), let
G(t, γ) ≡ θˆ
D − θˆW
αD
= t− γE[θ]− (1− γ)E[θ|θ < t], (9)
where θˆD and θˆW are the inferences if observers believe that the threshold is t. An
equilibrium threshold θ∗ satisfies G(θ∗, γ) = 0. For a stable equilibrium, G1(θ∗, γ) > 0,
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so that a marginal increase in the perceived threshold encourages disclosure by the
marginal type. Under the market perceptions associated with such a marginal increase,
the firm then prefers to disclose at a critical threshold below the increased threshold.
Since G(θ, γ) < 0 for a given γ ∈ [0, 1] and G(θ, γ) > 0, there exists at least one stable
equilibrium in the interval [θ, θ].
To derive comparative statics of θ∗ with respect to γ in the neighborhood of a stable















E[θ]− E[θ|θ < θ∗]
G1(θ∗, γ)
> 0. (10)
The last inequality holds for stable equilibria (G1(θ
∗, γ) > 0) since E[θ] > E[θ|θ < θ∗].
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions of the basic model, in stable equilibria:
1. The amount of disclosure increases with the fraction of observers who are attentive
about the withholding of information αW ;
2. The amount of disclosure decreases with the fraction of observers who attend to
disclosure αD.
4.3 Accuracy of Observer Perceptions
We now examine how attention affects the accuracy (bias and mean squared error) of
observers’ average perception.
4.3.1 Optimism
Observers on average tend to be optimistic about the quality of the informed party
(E[θˆ] > E[θ]). On the one hand, for a given threshold θ∗, credulity about non-disclosure
increases the average perception— inattentive individuals perceive the type of a non-
disclosing informed player as on average E[θ] instead of θ < θ∗. On the other hand,
inattention to disclosure tends to decrease average perception— inattentive individuals
perceive the type of a disclosing informed player as on average E[θ] instead of the
disclosed θ > θ∗, which on average must be greater than E[θ]. However, so long as
αW < αD, the first effect dominates (see the Appendix). We therefore have:
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Proposition 3 If αD > αW , then observers are on average overoptimistic about the
informed signal (E[θˆ] > E[θ]). If αD = αW , then observers on average correctly assess
the quality of the informed player.
Although there is an average tendency toward optimism, owing to cue neglect average
investor perceptions are too pessimistic when θ is sufficiently high.
Similar points may apply more broadly in settings where an informed player has some
discretion in what he tells an observer with limited attention. Psychologists have found
that individuals on average tend to exhibit unrealistic optimism about the likelihood
of experiencing favorable personal outcomes. Adam Smith (1776), in regard to “the
greater part of mankind,” referred to “Their absurd presumption in their own good
fortune...” Psychological research has also confirmed that individuals are subject to
unrealistic optimism (Weinstein (1980, 1982)).
Unrealistic optimism may result in part from limited attention. Life events are sub-
stantially influenced by the strategic revelation policies of interested, informed parties.
Participants in business and personal relationships often conceal their lack of commit-
ment; as a result, all too often people are shocked when they lose their jobs or life
partners ‘out of the blue.’ Our analysis suggests that credulity about the strategic
incentives of others may be a source of unrealistic optimism.14,15
Differentiating the average optimism (38) with respect to αW and αD, it is not hard
to verify that more attention to disclosed signals discourages disclosure, and thereby
increases optimism; and that greater attention to non-disclosure decreases optimism.
14Kennedy and Dimick (1987) find that 48% of college athletes in revenue-producing sports expect
to play professionally, while the actual figure is 2%. Colleges may have an incentive to allow athletes
to believe they have a real shot at going professional, rather than disclosing adverse information about
likelihood of success.
15To give a conjectural hint about how such an issue could be modelled, consider a social exchange
setting in which two individuals play a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma over an infinite number of periods.
In such a setting there may be a trigger strategy equilibrium enforcing cooperation (C) as opposed
to defection (D). However, in round t one party I receives private information about the value of an
external option that will become available in round t + k, where k > 0 is known to all. To exploit
the external option he must, at time t + k, abandon the existing relationship, i.e., he must play D at
round t+ k and at all later rounds. If the external option is sufficiently favorable, it pays for him to do
so. I’s signal provides him with superior information in round t about whether he will later abandon
the current relationship. If the uninformed party U infers that I is sufficiently likely to abandon, then
the trigger strategy equilibrium breaks down and U defects immediately as well. Such breakdown of
cooperation is costly to I, who prefers to reap the rewards of the old relationship longer. Thus, under
limited attention, I may benefit from concealing favorable external options, thereby encouraging U to
be optimistic about I’s commitment to the relationship.
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Proposition 4 In the neighborhood of a stable equilibrium, average optimism E[θˆ − θ]
increases as attention to disclosure increases (dE[θˆ − θ]/dαD > 0) and decreases with
attention to non-disclosure (dE[θˆ − θ]/dαW < 0) .
In addition, greater uncertainty by observers about the informed player’s information
increases optimism; it is not hard to show that if the density of θ is horizontally stretched
by a factor of K, then average optimism is also multiplied by K.
4.3.2 Mean Squared Error
The mean squared deviation of the average perception held by observers about the
informed party from the actual type,
E[(θˆ − θ)2] =
∫ θ∗
θ
(θˆW − θ)2f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ
θ∗
(θˆD − θ)2f(θ)dθ, (11)
is a measure of the inaccuracy of observer perceptions.
Proposition 5 If there is a higher probability that observers attend to disclosed infor-
mation than to the fact that information is withheld, αD > αW , then in the neighborhood
of a stable equilibrium:
1. The mean squared error of the average observer perceptions as an estimate of the
true type decreases in αW .
2. The mean squared error of the average observer perceptions as an estimate of the
true type can either increase or decrease as αD increases.
The proof is contained in the Appendix.
Intuitively, by Proposition 2, the more attentive observers are about non-disclosure,
the more disclosure occurs. Greater disclosure makes beliefs on average more accurate,
implying a lower mean squared error. It is true that perceptions are sometimes inaccurate
even after disclosure so long as αD < 1. However, since αD > αW , the frequency of
inaccurate perceptions is lower when the informed player discloses than when he does
not disclose. Furthermore, greater αW implies the average perception of observers about
a non-disclosing type is more accurate as E[θ|θ < θ∗] is a better estimate of a non-
disclosing type than E[θ]
In contrast, the comparative statics with respect to αD is ambiguous. The more
attentive observers are to disclosure, the less disclosure occurs (Proposition 2). For
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reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, less disclosure tends to increase the mean
squared error of the average investor perception if αD > αW . However, a countervailing
force is that higher αD increases the probability that an individual incorporates the
disclosed information into his beliefs.
5 Competing Attentional Demands and Salience
When individuals have limited cognitive capacity it is impossible to attend to all decision-
relevant information of different forms and derived from different sources. The allocation
of attention across strategic considerations or information signals will in general be biased
by the salience of different aspects of the decision environment. As discussed in Section
2.1, there is extensive evidence from the psychology literature that attention is selective,
and that the allocation of attention across stimuli often does not correspond very well
to differences in the informativeness or usefulness of different signals. We now explore
a setting in which disclosure or non-disclosure in each arena influences perceptions and
disclosure behavior in the other.
In this setting there are two arenas of disclosure, i = A or B. The informed player
in arena i observes a signal θi, where θi ≤ θi ≤ θi. Disclosure decisions in each arena
are taken simultaneously. An observer who attends to disclosure or to non-disclosure in
a given arena updates his belief rationally, whereas an observer who fails to attend to
arena i holds to his prior about θi.
We consider a very simple form of limited attention: individuals can attend to one
or the other arena, but not both. This specification captures the notion of information
overload in a simple way. In more realistic settings with multiple arenas, it is likely
that attention can be complementary within some groups of arenas. In attentionally
related arenas, paying attention to one arena may increase attention to the others in
the same group. Nevertheless, limited attention implies that an increase of attention in
some arenas must be offset by decreased attention in some other arena. For example,
news about a particular biotech company may draw investors’ attention to other biotech
firms while reducing attention to firms in other industries. Our two-arena approach
is based upon the unavoidability of attentional substitutions. Our model captures the
competitive nature of attention, as supported by the experimental studies on selective
attention; our results in two-arena cases can be interpreted more broadly as involving
competition between attentional sectors.
Borrowing from the literature in experimental psychology on multiple cue learning
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(see Section 2.1), we call the tendency for an information disclosure in one arena to
distract observers from attending to a disclosure in the other arena cue competition. We
call the tendency for an information disclosure in one arena to distract observers from
inferring the reason for an action or failure to act in another arena analytic interference.
5.1 The Basic Model with Competing Information Sources
For each arena A and B, we will first show that an equilibrium of the sort described in
the preceding section applies. Limited attention determines the fraction of the observers







If the individual is faced with no disclosure in either arena, we assume that he attends
to one or the other arena with equal probability. If there is disclosure about one arena
but not another, then the effect of the disclosure on attention to the other arena is
assumed to be related to the salience of the information disclosure.
We allow different arenas of disclosure to have different levels of salience or vividness.
For simplicity the amount of attentional interference between arenas depends only on
whether disclosure occurred, not on the signal realization. The saliences of arenas A and
B, denoted sA or sB > 0, help determine the probability that individuals will attend to
each arena.
In the absence of any attention-grabbing events, the probability of an individual
attending to A versus B would be .5. If the arena A signal is withheld and the arena
B signal is disclosed, arena B is likely to capture a greater share of observer attention.
To reflect the higher salience of occurrence than non-occurrence of an event, we assume
that the probability that an individual attends to arena A or to B is
αA(WA, DB) = .5(1− sB)
αB(WA, DB) = .5(1 + sB). (12)
Thus, as the salience of disclosure in arena B increases, it robs more attention from
the non-disclosing arena A. If the salience of the disclosed information is 0 this effect
vanishes (B gets only its 50:50 share of attention). However, as salience rises to 1 the
probability of attending to A diminishes to zero. Symmetrically, we assume that
αA(DA,WB) = .5(1 + sA)
αB(DA,WB) = .5(1− sA). (13)
If there is disclosure in both arenas, then it is assumed that the probability that an
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individual attends to A or to B is
αA(DA, DB) = .5(1 + sA − sB)
αB(DA, DB) = .5(1− sA + sB). (14)
There is a greater tendency to attend to the more salient arena, and if the difference in
salience between the two arenas is maximal (1− 0 = 1), then an observer attends to the
more salient disclosure with certainty.
In equilibrium, the informed player in arena i takes the strategy of the other informed
player (i.e., player i′’s threshold value θ∗i′) as given. Each informed player therefore treats
the fraction of observers who will attend to disclosure, αDi , or to non-disclosure, α
W
i , in
his arena as given. Thus, we can apply the equilibrium of the previous section to each
of the arenas, to derive the threshold value in arena i, θ∗i , as a function of the proposed
critical value in the other arena i′, θ∗i′ . Given critical value θ
∗
B, the probability that an
observer attends to the fact that information is withheld in arena A is
αWA = αA(WA,WB)Pr(WB) + αA(WA, DB)Pr(DB)
= .5[Pr(θB < θ
∗
B)] + .5(1− sB)[Pr(θB > θ∗B)]
= .5[1− sB + sBF (θ∗B)]. (15)
Similarly, for arena B,
αWB = .5[1− sA + sAF (θ∗A)]. (16)
Given a proposed threshold in arena B, θ∗B, the probability that a given observer
attends to disclosure in arena A is
αDA = αA(DA,WB)Pr(WB) + αA(DA, DB)Pr(DB)
= .5(1 + sA)FB(θ
∗
B) + .5(1− sB + sA)[1− FB(θ∗B)]
= .5(1 + sA − sB[1− FB(θ∗B)]). (17)
The probability that an observer is attentive to disclosure in B is derived similarly:
αDB = .5(1 + sB − sA[1− FA(θ∗A)]). (18)
From (15)-(18), αDi > α
W
i when si > 0. We propose an equilibrium in which each
informed player follows a threshold disclosure rule, with cutoffs θ∗A and θ
∗
B. We determine
the equilibrium in each arena taking the cutoff in the other arena as given. We seek a
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set of self-confirming cutoff values that satisfy the basic model equilibrium conditions
together with (15)-(18).
However, in general there may be multiple equilibria, possibly asymmetric. High
disclosure in one arena can distract from the other, leading to lower disclosure in the
other. Later we will show uniqueness by direct calculation in the case of a uniform
distribution of types.
The equilibrium condition for informed player i to be just willing to disclose, as in
(5), is that





, i = A or B, (20)
and where αWi , α
D
i are the probabilities that individuals attend to either the withholding
of information, or the disclosure of information, in arena i.




A . But these in turn





we can solve for the reaction curve θ∗B(θ
∗
A). Together these reaction curves determine
equilibrium values for the two disclosure thresholds.





Without loss of generality set θA = θB = 0, and θA = θB = 1 (a rescaling and transla-








, i = A,B. (22)
We now solve for the attention parameters in arena A (the α’s) in terms of the
tendency for disclosure in arena B, as measured by the threshold in that arena, θ∗B.
From (15)-(18), this gives the reaction curve for the informed player in arena A, and a











1 + 2sB − sA + sAθ∗A
. (24)
Figure 1 shows reaction curves for different parameter values, and the equilibria deter-
mined by the intersections of these curves.
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Insert Figure 1 Here
Combining equations (23) and (24) gives the equilibrium disclosure threshold θ∗A as
a root of the quadratic equation
sA(1+2sA−sB)θ∗A2+[(1+2sA−sB)(1+2sB−sA)+sB2−sA2]θ∗A−sA(1+2sB−sA) = 0.
(25)
This equation has only one root between 0 and 1. Since 0 < θ∗A < 1, by (24), θ
∗
B is also
between 0 and 1. We therefore have:
Proposition 6 If the types of the informed players in two arenas are distributed uni-




B < 0, so the reaction curves are downward sloping. In other words,
disclosures in the two arenas are strategic substitutes. It follows that regulation that
forces more disclosure in one arena than would have occurred in equilibrium crowds out
disclosure in the other arena. Intuitively, reduced attention to B reduces the pressure
on a marginal B player to disclose.16
Proposition 7 Under the assumptions of this section, regulation that forces greater
disclosure in one arena (by reducing θ∗i in arena i) causes the informed player in the
other arena to disclose less information (i.e., in arena ∼ i the disclosure threshold θ∗∼i
increases).
5.2 Cross-Arena Contagion of News Announcements
This subsection examines the effect of disclosure versus non-disclosure in arena A on
the expected perception by observers of the signal value in a fundamentally-unrelated
arena B. Applied in a stock market setting, the results we derive describe how an
announcement about one stock, such as an earnings forecast or dividend announcement,
affects the price of another stock.
16Under alternative assumptions, the two arenas could be attentional complements so that disclosure
in one arena increases attention to the other arena. But there is still a crowding out effect when
disclosure in one arena results in much larger increase in attention to disclosure than increase in attention
to non-disclosure. Since greater attention to disclosure discourages disclosure, disclosure in one arena
can crowd out disclosure in the other arena by increasing attention to disclosure.
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Thus, we calculate E[θˆB|DA, θA] and E[θˆB|WA], where the expectation is taken with
respect to the possible outcome for θB. The average perception in arena B if the informed
player in arena B withholds, θˆWB , is, in analogy to equation (3),







If he discloses, then the average perception is
θˆDB = (1− αDB )E[θB] + αDBθB. (27)
Taking expectations over the possible values of θB, we find the expected perception by
observers of the informed player in arena B conditional on the behavior of the informed








= [αDB (φA)− αWB (φA)]
∫ θ∗B(φA)
θB
{E[θB]− θB}f(θB)dθB + E[θB]. (28)





thereby on θ∗B; attention in arena B depends on the disclosure choice and outcome in
arena A.
Comparing E[θˆB|DA, θA] with E[θˆB|WA], we obtain:
Proposition 8 Under the assumptions of the model, disclosure in one arena causes the
expected perception of the type in the other arena to increase.
Two further empirical implications follow from this approach by specializing the
analysis to a setting in which there is an exogenous probability of news arrival in one
of two arenas, instead of disclosure in both arenas. As in Proposition 8, it follows that
news arrival in one arena implies a positive revision of perceptions by observers in a
fundamentally unrelated arena, owing to a lack of skepticism about non-disclosure. For
example, a major general news event is predicted to distract attention from an unrelated
non-event such as a failure of a firm to make an earnings announcements, leading on
average to overvaluation. Second, the model implies that a major general news event will
distract attention from an unrelated news event such as a firm’s earnings announcement
(as reflected in equation (14)), leading to underreaction in investor perceptions to the
earnings surprise.
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The two arenas in our model have no fundamental relationship (θA and θB are in-
dependent). Cross-effects here are induced by the attentional relationship between the
two arenas. More generally, if there are many arenas, disclosure in any single arena
may have little effect on another arena unless there is some kind of attentional linkage
between the two. The attentional linkage could derive from a fundamental relationship,
or could be entirely superficial (as with two firms with similar-sounding names).17
When there are many arenas, the cross effect between attentionally related ones can
be positive. Instead of distracting, disclosure in a given arena can call further attention
to a few attentionally related arenas, while distracting slightly from a large number of
more distantly related arenas. Thus, in applying Proposition 8 to a stock market setting,
it is best to view Arenas A and B not as individual stocks, but as entire industries or
sectors. For example, if big news attracts attention to the high-tech sector, this may
distract investors from attending to disclosure or non-disclosure by firms in the energy
sector.
6 Welfare Effects of Disclosure Regulation
We examine here how disclosure regulation affects the accuracy of investor perceptions,
the degree of optimism, and welfare. If government simply mandates disclosure and that
mandate is always obeyed, in effect the disclosure threshold is set below θ. However,
often a more realistic description of the legal/regulatory environment is that only partial
disclosure is enforced, implying a threshold at an intermediate value between θ and θ.
The threat of liability for the failure to disclose can encourage a firm to do so (see,
e.g., Skinner (1994)), but may not enforce complete disclosure. Even when disclosure is
clearly mandated, in deciding whether to disclose firms may balance the risk of liability
against the costs of publicizing bad news.
Furthermore, there may sometimes be legal uncertainty as to whether disclosure of
the information item is mandatory. In either case, firms will be pressured to disclose
more bad news when there is a higher probability of legal liability for non-disclosure, and
when the expected penalties are higher. Thus, the legal/regulatory environment involves
different effects which can be viewed as adjusting the level of the threshold indirectly.
We assume that welfare is measured by the accuracy of investor perceptions. If there
17Rashes (2001) provides evidence of stock market pricing errors based upon investors being confused
by similarities in names and ticker symbols of different stocks, a clear symptom that limited attention
causes inappropriate contagion across arenas.
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is only a single arena, we define welfare as the negative of the mean squared error,
W ≡ −E[(θˆ − θ)2], (29)
where θˆ is the average perception of type conditional on the disclosure decision.
When there are multiple arenas, the value of belief accuracy will generally vary
depending on the arena’s size and characteristics.18 We therefore consider a social welfare
function that allows for unequal weights on perception errors between arenas A and B,
W ≡ −λE[(θˆA − θA)2]− (1− λ)E[(θˆB − θB)2], (30)
where θˆA and θˆB are the average perceptions of type in the two arenas conditional on
the disclosure decision, and λ measures the relative importance of the two arenas.
We begin by describing the effects of regulation when there is only a single arena.
Proposition 9 Under the assumptions of the basic model, if there is a higher probability
that observers attend to the disclosed information than to the fact that information is
withheld, αD > αW , then:
1. Suppose that a regulation imposes a disclosure threshold level below that implied by
the indifference condition (5). Then, as the regulated threshold decreases (greater
disclosure), the mean squared error of the average observer perception as an esti-
mate of the true type decreases, and social welfare increases.
2. If the regulated disclosure threshold θ∗ < E[θ], then an exogenous decrease in the
regulated threshold reduces optimism.
So long as regulation encourages disclosure (perhaps by imposing a risk of liability on
a non-disclosing firm), the condition θ∗ < E[θ] holds (by Proposition 1), because this
condition holds even when there is no regulation.
The accuracy of observers’ beliefs increases with the amount of disclosure. Consider
now a regulation that imposes a level of disclosure θ∗. Intuitively, higher θ∗ (a milder
18For example, one arena may have greater payoff variability than the other, so that the benefits of
accurate information differs across arenas. The validity of investor perceptions of the paper clip industry
may matter less than perceptions of the steel industry. Also, an incorrect perception of a state of the
world that is not very relevant for the observer’s actions may matter less than a highly action-relevant
state of the world. Alternatively, the informed player’s ‘type’ in our model could be viewed as a noisy
indicator of value, where the noise variance can differ across arenas. Other things equal, the social value
of accurate communication of a noisier signal is smaller than communication of a more accurate one.
Also, the qualitative nature of the information disclosed is important for welfare; see, e.g., the analysis
of Boot and Thakor (2001).
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disclosure requirement) increases the probability that observers hold to their prior beliefs
(since αD > αW ) instead of updating appropriately. It also tends to make even fully
rational inferences of type more noisy by increasing the set of types that are not revealed
(see the Appendix, Proof of Proposition 9, Part 1).
Policymakers have sometimes expressed concern that investors can be overwhelmed
by information with limited usefulness, which may prevent them from processing ef-
fectively other information that is more useful. For example, a Supreme Court ruling
on TSC industries, Inc. v. Northway states that “Some information is of such dubi-
ous significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good.
...[M]anagement’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to
bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information – a result that is hardly
conducive to informed decision making.” (As quoted by Paredes (2004), p.27.) The
court’s concern was with disclosure of low quality information; we show here that there
are related problems even with the disclosure of accurate and relevant information.
When there are multiple arenas, we can examine the effects of a change in the
disclosure rule in one of the arenas, or in both simultaneously.
Proposition 10 1. If there is disclosure in two arenas, then an exogenous increase
in the disclosure threshold (implying a lower probability of disclosure) in one arena
causes average beliefs to be more accurate (lower mean-squared-error) in the other
arena in the neighborhood of a stable equilibrium.
2. An exogenous increase in the disclosure threshold in one arena reduces optimism
in the other arena in the neighborhood of a stable equilibrium.
3. Forced disclosure in one arena can reduce welfare by discouraging disclosure in the
other arena.
4. If there is disclosure in two arenas, then a simultaneous exogenous increase in the
disclosure threshold in both arenas (θ∗ = θ∗A = θ
∗
B) can cause average beliefs in each
area to become either more or less accurate, i.e., ∂E[(θˆ − θ)2]/∂θ∗ can be negative
or positive. Thus, even though there are no costs of disclosure, forced disclosure
in both arenas can reduce welfare.
The proof of Parts 1, 2, and 3 are in the Appendix. Intuitively, there is a crowding
out effect of disclosure. For example, if regulators impose higher disclosure in arena
A, then this distracts observers from arena B. The lower attention to either disclosure
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or non-disclosure in arena B makes beliefs in arena B less accurate, which can reduce
welfare, especially if arena B is more important than arena A.
This suggests an important limitation to disclosure regulation. It is impossible to
regulate disclosure in all arenas. Even if high disclosure were required of all firms, there
is private information in other parts of economic and social life. The effect of imposing
disclosure requirements in some arenas but not others may be to redirect attention rather
than to improve the accuracy of all perceptions. This suggests that a relevant input for
regulatory decisions is the importance of different arenas for the decisions of observers.
To prove Part 4, we consider the case of symmetric salience and calculate the mean
squared error of beliefs as a function of the common cutoff θ∗. When the θi’s are
distributed uniformly on [0, 1], by direct calculation the mean squared error can increase
or decrease with the common cutoff θ∗. For example, when sA = sB = 0.99 and θ∗ = 0.4,
∂E[(θˆ−θ)2]/∂θ∗ ≈ −0.021, but when sA = sB = 0.1, the derivative is positive (≈ 0.025).
Part 3 indicates that disclosure in a less important arena may distract so much
from disclosure in the important arena that welfare declines. To gain further insight
about this finding, consider the symmetric case where sA = sB = s. Using the attention
probabilities given in equations (15)-(18), we can differentiate welfare with respect to the
disclosure threshold for A (holding constant θ∗B); details are provided in the Appendix,
proof of Part 3. In this case, ∂W/∂θ∗A as a function of s and λ is shown in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 Here
As seen in Figure 2, ∂W/∂θ∗A is positive when the salience s is high and the weight
on arena A is low. Forced disclosure in arena A (lower θ∗A) can decrease welfare when
the importance of arena B is high (lower λ) and the salience is high. A high salience of
disclosure in arena A, combined with greater disclosure in A, makes withholding more
attractive in arena B. Therefore, forced disclosure in A can have a negative overall effect
by discouraging disclosure in the more important arena.
In Part 4 there are countervailing effects. On the one hand, greater disclosure in one
arena has a direct tendency to increase the precision of observer beliefs in that arena.
On the other hand, it distracts attention from the other arena, which tends to reduce
precision there. Overall, jointly forcing increased disclosure can reduce belief precisions
and therefore welfare, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Letting θ∗A = θ
∗
B ≡ θ∗, as illustrated in Figure 3, ∂W/∂θ∗ is positive for high values
of s and negative for low values of s (calculations in the Appendix).
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Insert Figure 3 Here
Intuitively, although forcing disclosure in both arenas directly increases the amount of
information available, it also makes people less attentive to a given datum. If salience is
high enough, the second effect (lower attention) can outweigh the first (more informa-
tion/disclosure).
7 Optimal Allocation of Attention
Even boundedly rational observers can try hard to attend to those signals that offer high
return to attention. This section generalizes the basic single-arena model of Section 3
to allow individuals to decide ex ante how much attention to allocate to either disclosed
information or the strategic implications of non-disclosure. We first examine whether
the qualitative and comparative statics implications the the basic model survive in a
setting with endogenous allocation of attention. We then examine how the technology
for allocating attention affects comparative statics. Specifically, we examine how the de-
gree of complementarity or substitutability between attention to disclosed signals versus
attention to non-disclosure affects individuals’ decisions.
The focus of the analysis here is on the first arena A, but we include a second arena B
to give individuals an opportunity cost of attending to arena A. Individuals ex ante also
have a choice within arena A as to how much attention to devote to disclosed information
versus the failure of information to be disclosed.
There are two stages in the model. In the first stage identical observers choose
attention probabilities αWA , α
D
A , as defined earlier, and the probability of attending to a
second independent arena B, αB. This choice is not observable to the informed player,
although in equilibrium he knows what the choice will be.
In the second stage, attention outcomes are realized, so each observer either attends
or does not attend to each arena and forms beliefs accordingly. The informed player
observes his private signal about arena A, and decides whether or not to disclose. At
this point, the decision problem of the informed player is identical to that of the informed
player in the basic model. So the disclosure threshold θ∗A is determined as in the basic
model as a function of αWA and α
D
A .
Also at the second stage, each observer makes a project choice based on his beliefs
at that time. Thus, at the first stage the individual allocates attention so as to increase
the quality of his later project choice. Let θA be an observer’s net payoff from adopting
the arena A project. We assume that if he is indifferent, he adopts the project. Thus,
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he adopts if and only if θA ≥ 0. For algebraic simplicity, we assume that E[θA] = 0,
so that an individual who does not attend to arena A is just willing to undertake the
project. Similar results apply more generally.
Also for simplicity, we assume that there is no disclosure game in arena B. Instead,
an information signal becomes public spontaneously and with certainty. We therefore
assume that the B component of the observers’ payoffs is equal to αBK, where K > 0
is a constant.19
From the analysis of the basic model, θ∗A < E[θA] = 0. When an individual attends
to a disclosure in arena A, he adopts the project if and only if θA > 0. When he attends
to a failure to disclose, he rejects the project since E[θA|θA < θ∗A] < 0. As discussed
above, whenever an individual fails to attend (either to a disclosure or to a failure to
disclose), he adopts. Thus, his expected payoff from his arena A project choices given
his attention probabilities αDA and α
W
A is
Π = (1− αDA )Pr(θA > θ∗A)E[θA|θA > θ∗A]
+ αDAPr(θA > 0)E[θA|θA > 0] + (1− αWA )Pr(θA < θ∗A)E[θA|θA < θ∗A] + αWA · (0)






















Adding to this the expected profit from the arena B project, an observer’s overall














subject to the attention allocation constraint,
G(αWA , α
D
A , αB) ≤ 1, (32)
where G(·, ·, ·) is weakly increasing in each of its arguments.
The function G reflects the degree to which the individual is able to substitute
attention between different arenas, and between attention toward disclosure in Arena
19It is easy to endogenize this form by introducing an investment project related to arena B with
net value kθB , where E[θB ] = 0 and k > 0. Attending to B allows an observer to obtain on average
kE[θB |θB ≥ 0] by investing when doing so is profitable, instead of always investing for an average payoff
of 0. In this setting, arena B contributes αBkE[θB |θB ≥ 0] to the observer’s expected profits, so that
K = kE[θB |θB ≥ 0].
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A and attention toward withholding of information in Arena A. For example, If the
individual has good control over his attention, the α’s may be highly substitutable.
On the other hand, if vividness and salience grab people’s attention without conscious
volition, the different α’s may be highly complementary in G, so that it is hard for the
individual to shift the proportions between the α’s from some natural ratio.
We consider a tractable functional form for G,
G(αWA , α
D
A , αB) =
[
sW (σWαWA )
p + sD(σDαDA )
p + (1− sW − sD)αB
]−1/p
, (33)
where p > 1 and σW and σD are exogenous parameters which measure the opportunity
cost of directing attention to a particular target (the opportunity cost of directing atten-
tion to arena B is normalized to 1). sW and sD correspond to relative factor shares in the
constant elasticity of substitution production function, where sW , sD, and 1− sW − sD











which is a decreasing function of p.
Proposition 11 If individuals decide how much attention to devote to either disclosed
information or the implications of non-disclosure subject to the attention transformation
constraint (33), and an interior equilibrium obtains with 0 < αWA < α
D
A < 1, then
1. The amount of disclosure increases with the opportunity cost of attending to dis-
closure (dθ∗A/dσ
D < 0);
2. The amount of disclosure decreases with the opportunity cost of attending to non-
disclosure (dθ∗A/dσ
W > 0);
3. If σWαW < σDαD, then the amount of disclosure decreases with the elasticity




A/dp < 0). If σ
WαW > σDαD, then the
amount of disclosure increases with the elasticity of substitution (dθ∗A/dp > 0).
If attention is highly substitutable (p close to 1) the condition that an interior equilibrium
obtain may fail. However, if substitutability is sufficiently limited (p sufficiently large),
then an interior equilibrium exists.
The comparative statics when individuals have an allocation choice (Proposition 11
Parts 1 and 2) are similar to those with exogenous α’s, as described in Section 4.2,
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Proposition 2. Since an increase in σD increases the opportunity cost of attending to
disclosure, it causes less attention to disclosure, and a lower threshold (more disclosure).
An increase in σW makes attending to non-disclosure more costly, which reduces at-
tention to withholding, and thereby increases the disclosure threshold (less disclosure).
Thus, variation in the cost of attending to different arenas (the σ’s) leads to compara-
tive statics on the amount of disclosure essentially identical to those in the basic model
varying the α’s.
To build intuition for Part 3 of Proposition 11, observe that σWαW−σDαD is positive
if the attention expenditure share on αW is greater than the expenditure share on αD.
In this situation, the balance of costs and benefit has caused the individual to substitute
resources toward αW . So when attention becomes more substitutable, he substitutes even
more attention toward αW , which increases disclosure and decreases θ∗ (Proposition 2).
The reverse happens when σWαW < σDαD.
Example: Perfect Complementarity:
The analysis matches that of the basic model even more closely in the extreme
special case of perfect complementarity between between withholding and disclosing.
The perfect complementarity case is obtained when the elasticity of substitution goes
to zero (p → ∞) in the attention allocation constraints. Since G ≤ 1, it is optimal to
allocate attention so as to equate the three components such that
σWαWA = σ
DαDA = αB = 1;








Each of the α’s in (34) is a function only of its corresponding exogenous σ. It follows that
all propositions of the model with exogenous attention levels are consistent with the per-
fect complementarity case, with comparative statics on α’s interpreted as corresponding
variations in σ’s as in (34). For example, the amount of disclosure increases with the
opportunity cost of attending to disclosure (dθ∗/dσD < 0) and the amount of disclosure
decreases with the opportunity cost of attending to non-disclosure (dθ∗/dσW > 0).
8 Summary and Conclusion
This paper models limited attention as incomplete usage of publicly available informa-
tion. Informed players decide whether or not to disclose information to an audience
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of observers who sometimes neglect either disclosed signals or the implications of non-
disclosure. In equilibrium, we find that observers are unrealistically optimistic, disclosure
is incomplete, neglect of disclosed signals increases disclosure, and neglect of a failure
to disclose reduces disclosure. We also find that these insights extend to a setting in
which observers choose ex ante how to allocate their limited attention. In a setting with
multiple arenas of disclosure, we find that disclosure in one arena affects perceptions
in fundamentally unrelated arenas, owing to cue competition, salience, and analytic
interference; and that disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in another.
We consider the implications of limited attention and the resulting credulity of ob-
servers for disclosure regulation. Law and regulation in the U.S. require firms to reveal
information in financial reports, and to disclose other relevant information. Such reg-
ulation is not needed in the classic unravelling models of disclosure, in which rational
observers, through appropriate skepticism, induce full disclosure, and full disclosure is a
good thing. Extensions with costly disclosure can create a rationale for regulation, but
the recommendation is very simple: force additional disclosure only if the social benefits
exceed the costs.
In contrast, limited attention suggests that the balance of considerations is more
complex, even when disclosure is costless. On the one hand, informed parties may
conceal information in the hope of exploiting the inattention and credulity of observers.
This puts regulation of disclosure on the table. However, we find, paradoxically, that
regulations designed to force greater disclosure can make perceptions less accurate. For
example, we find that forced disclosure in one arena can crowd out disclosure in another,
and thereby can reduce welfare. Thus, even if forced disclosure in one arena creates
benefits to observers in that arena, there is no presumption that forced disclosure is
socially desirable.
Furthermore, forcing simultaneous disclosure in multiple arenas can also reduce wel-
fare, for two reasons. First, greater forced disclosure can increase what we call analytic
interference, wherein a disclosed signal in one arena distracts observers from analyz-
ing the reasons for a failure of a player to disclose in the other arena. Second, even
if complete disclosure be enforced in both arenas, greater disclosure can cause greater
cue competition between disclosures— observers have trouble attending to both signals.
Even though more information is publicly available, observer perceptions may on average
be less accurate.
Thus, to determine whether forcing greater disclosure in one or in many arenas
will improve welfare, policymakers have a challenging task. Evaluating such a policy
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requires an assessment of the relative importance of the different arenas, the precision
of the information that might be disclosed, and the salience of the different arenas.
An issue not captured in our model that deserves further exploration is that in reality
an informed party can misrepresent by ‘disclosing’ an incorrect value for his information
signal. This issue is highlighted by U.S. and global corporate accounting scandals such as
those involving Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat. Limits to investor attention presum-
ably affect the incentives for firms to engage in fraud, or milder shading of the truth. An
interesting further direction would be to analyze how different regulatory policies influ-
ence the incentives for firms to exploit inattentive observers through misrepresentation
as well as simply not disclosing.
We close by emphasizing that the general approach to limited attention offered here
may be applicable to a variety of human transactions. As argued in Subsection 2.2, there
are various interactions in which informed players seem to take advantage of inattention
to manipulate the perceptions of others. Some possible directions that merit further
exploration include the advertising of products to consumers, the reporting of firms’
financial condition to investors, the presentation of information by political activists,
and the presentation of personal information by individuals in their everyday lives. The
approach described here—in which observers have limited ability to attend to public
signals or to features of the strategic environment, salience parameters influence which
signals or environmental features are attended to more, and the occurence of an event
is more salient than non-occurence—may be helpful in capturing parsimoniously the
effects of limited attention in a range of contexts.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We now show that if αW < αD there is no equilibrium with
full disclosure. The most skeptical inference in any equilibrium that could be drawn
about non-disclosure would be θˆ = θ. Thus, observers’ perception of a withholding
player satisfies
θˆW ≥ (1− αW )E[θ] + αW θ. (35)
The perception upon disclosing for a type θ = θ +  is
θˆD = (1− αD)E[θ] + αD(θ + ). (36)
Thus,
θˆW − θˆD ≥ (αD − αW ) (E[θ]− θ)− αD
> 0, (37)
where the last inequality holds, for given αW and αD, by choosing  to satisfy
0 <  <
(αD − αW )(E[θ]− θ)
αD
.
Thus, in any equilibrium there exists a set of types with θ < θ + ,  small that prefer
not to disclose. Furthermore, so long as γ < 1, θ∗ < E[θ]. Otherwise, there would be an
above-average type (θ > E[θ]) who prefers not to disclose. This is impossible; if he does
not disclose, the average perception of his type is below E[θ], by (3), whereas if he does
disclose, he is correctly perceived as having information θ > E[θ]. ‖
Proof of Proposition 3:
E[θˆ − θ] =
∫ θ∗
θ




{(1− αD)E[θ] + αDθ − θ}f(θ)dθ
= {(1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗]}F (θ∗)− E[θ|θ < θ∗]F (θ∗)
+(1− αD)E[θ][1− F (θ∗)]− (1− αD) {E[θ]− E[θ|θ < θ∗]F (θ∗)}
= (αD − αW )F (θ∗) (E[θ]− E[θ|θ < θ∗]) . (38)
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Since αD > αW and E[θ] > E[θ|θ < θ∗], E[θˆ − θ] > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
dE[θˆ − θ]
dαW









Since E[θ] > E[θ|θ < θ∗], αD > αW , E[θ] > θ∗, dθ∗/dαW < 0 and dθ∗/dαD > 0,
E[θˆ − θ]/dαW < 0 and E[θˆ − θ]/dαD > 0 ‖
Proof of Proposition 5: By (3)–(4), we can rewrite the MSE as









(1− αD) (E[θ]− θ)}2 f(θ)dθ. (39)



































for a stable equilibrium.
To see how the mean squared error varies with αD, substitute θ∗ of the uniform [0, 1]
distribution case from (21) into the MSE formula, (11), and differentiating with respect






6(2αD − αW )4
]{
8(1− αD)4 − 3(αW )2(1− αW )2 − 8(1− αD)3(3− 2αW )
+ 4(1− αD)2 [6− 8αW + 3(αW )2]− (1− αD) [8− 16αW + 21(αW )2 − 6(αW )3]} ,
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which can be either positive or negative: dE[(θˆ − θ)2]/dαD = −0.0354938 when (αW , αD) =
(0.4, 0.5), and dE[(θˆ − θ)2]/dαD = 0.000708395 when (αW , αD) = (0.4, 0.95). ‖
Proof of Proposition 8: To condition on DA, we substitute α
W
B from (16) and α
D
B
from (18) when θ∗A = θ (implying certainty of disclosure in arena A). This yields
αWB (DA) = .5(1− sA), αDB (DA) = .5(1 + sB − sA). (42)
Similarly, to condition on WA, we substitute α
W
B from (16) and α
D
B from (18) when
θ∗A = θ (implying no disclosure in arena A). This yields
αWB (WA) = .5, α
D
B (WA) = .5(1 + sB). (43)
From (42) and (43), the difference
αDB (DA)− αWB (DA) = αDB (WA)− αWB (WA) = .5sB
does not depend on the disclosure decision in arena A.
By Proposition 1, E[θB] > θ
∗
B > 0. Therefore, if θB < θ
∗
B, E[θB] − θB > 0, which
implies that the integral on the RHS of the final equation in (28) is increasing with θ∗B.
Thus, substituting φA = WA or DA into (28), we see that E[θˆB|DA] > E[θˆB|WA] if
and only if θ∗B(DA) > θ
∗
B(WA). Let γB = (α
D
B − αWB )/(αDB ). Since
γB(DA) = sB/(1 + sB − sA) > sB/(1 + sB) = γB(WA),
θ∗B(DA) > θ
∗
B(WA). Thus E[θˆB|DA] > E[θˆB|WA]. ‖







(1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗]− θ}2 f(θ)dθ + ∫ θ
θ∗
{
(1− αD) (E[θ]− θ)}2 f(θ)dθ
=
{
(1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗]}2 ∫ θ∗
θ


























− 2{(1− αW )E[θ] + αWE[θ|θ < θ∗]} θ∗f(θ∗)
+ (θ∗)2f(θ∗)− {(1− αD) (E[θ]− θ∗)}2 f(θ∗). (45)






(θ∗ − E[θ|θ < θ∗]) and∫ θ∗
θ
θf(θ)dθ = E[θ|θ < θ∗]F (θ∗),
∂E[(θˆ − θ)2]
∂θ∗
= f(θ∗)[1− (1− αW )2](θ∗ − E[θ|θ < θ∗])2
+ f(θ∗)[(1− αW )2 − (1− αD)2](θ∗ − E[θ])2 > 0.
Part 2:
E[θˆ − θ] = (αD − αW )F (θ∗)(E[θ]− E[θ|θ < θ∗])
∂E[θˆ − θ]
∂θ∗
= (αD − αW )f(θ∗)(E[θ]− θ∗) > 0, when E[θ] > θ∗. (46)
‖
Proof of Proposition 10, Part 1: The mean squared error in arena i is











(1− αDi ) (E[θi]− θi)
}2
f(θi)dθi, (47)
where αWi , α
D
i , and θ
∗
i are functions of θ
∗
∼i, the critical value in the other arena. The



























i − αWi )(2− αDi − αWi )(θ∗i − E[θi])2. (48)
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By inspection of equations (15)-(18), the derivatives of αWi and α
D




























Therefore, in the neighborhood of a stable equilibrium (∂θ∗i /∂γi > 0), the mean squared

















F (θ∗i )(E[θi]− E[θi|θi < θ∗i ])
+(αDi − αWi )f(θ∗i )(E[θi]− θ∗i )
∂θ∗i
∂θ∗∼i




The last line follows from equations (49) and (50). ‖
Proof of Proposition 10, Part 3: To prove Part 3, we differentiate the welfare
function with respect to θ∗A when θA and θB are distributed uniformly over [0, 1]. The







− 2s{−1 + (θ∗B)3 + λ [4− 12θ∗A − (θ∗B)3 + 9(θ∗A)2 + 3(θ∗A)2θ∗B]}
+ s2{2(θ∗B − 1)[3(θ∗B − 1)θ∗B + θ∗A + θ∗Aθ∗B + θ∗A(θ∗B)2]
+ λ[−3 + 12(θ∗B)2 − 6(θ∗B)3 − 9(θ∗A)2 + 18(θ2A)2θ∗B
+ 3(θ2A)
2(θ∗B)
2 + 14θ∗A − 24θ∗Aθ∗B − 2θ∗A(θ∗B)3]}). (52)
Using the symmetric solution to equation (25) when salience is s, ∂W/∂θ∗A = 0.02244
when (s, λ) = (0.8, 0.2), and it becomes −0.01663 when (s, λ) = (0.8, 0.9). ‖
Calculations Underlying Figure 3: We differentiate the welfare W with respect to
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{−9θ∗2 − 2s[2− 12θ∗ + 9(θ∗)2 + 4(θ∗)3] + s2[−3 + 22θ∗ − 45(θ∗)2 + 24(θ∗)3 + 5(θ∗)4]} .
The derivative ∂W/∂θ∗ is positive for high value and negative for low values of s. For
example, ∂W/∂θ∗ = 0.0114 when s = 0.8, and ∂W/∂θ∗ = −0.0079 when s = 0.2. ‖
Proof of Proposition 11: For notational simplicity, we henceforth suppress the A
subscripts of αWA , α
D
A , and θA. By (32) and (33) we substitute out
αB =
1− sW (σWαW )p − sD(σDαD)p
(1− sW − sD) ,






(1− sW − sD)s
























The disclosure threshold is determined by equations (5) and (6) of the basic model
applied to arena A. By (54), the ratio αW/αD does not depend on K, the weight in
the observers objective on payoffs derived from attending to arena B. Therefore, we can
ensure that αB > 0 by selecting K sufficiently large without affecting the equilibrium
disclosure level. Also, for appropriate values of parameters σW and σD, αD > αW ,
ensuring that the equilibrium involves only partial disclosure. By equation (54) and
since E[θ] = 0, equation (5) can be rearranged to yield























































































































































































Multiplying equation (55) by
∫ θ∗
θ
f(θ)dθ and differentiating both sides with respect to γ













θ∗ > 0. (60)
The second term of the expression inside the brackets in equations (58) and (59) can be












Substituting the right hand side of equation (61) for the second term inside the brackets
































































































From (58), (59), and (65), Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 11 follow immediately.







































































































By (65), the left hand side of equation (67) is negative, and the sign of the right hand
side depends on whether σWαW is greater or less than σDαD, ∂θ∗/∂p < 0 when σWαW <
σDαD and ∂θ∗/∂p > 0 σWαW > σDαD. This confirms Proposition 11 Part 3.
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Figure 2: Welfare effect of exogenous increase in the disclosure threshold of
arena A
The graph shows the derivative of welfare as defined by equation (30) with respect to
an exogenous increase in the disclosure threshold in arena A, θ∗
A
, as a function of the




















Figure 3: Welfare effect of exogenous increase in the common disclosure
threshold of arenas A and B
The graph shows the derivative of welfare as defined by equation (30) with respect to
an exogenous increase in the common disclosure threshold for arenas A and B, θ∗, as
a function of the common salience of disclosure s, and the weight λ on arena A in the
social welfare function.
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